INTRODUCTION
A list of axioms, adapted from those which uniquely characterize the Shapley value for finite-player cooperative games, determines a unique value on certain classes of nonatomic cooperative gamesᎏgames involving an infinite number of players, each of which is individually insignificant Ž . Aumann and Shapley, 1974 . Concrete criteria for identifying a given nonatomic game as belonging to such a class of games, and a formula for computing the value, are known for certain kinds of vector measure games Ž . Aumann and Shapley, 1974 . In a vector measure game, the worth of a coalition S depends only on the value that a particular vector measure on the space of players takes in S. In this context, the term ''vector measure'' usually refers to an R n -valued measure, that is, to a vector of n scalar measures. However, certain nonatomic games are more naturally the maximum aggregate utility that S can guarantee to itself by an allocation x of its aggregate endowment H a dm among its members S w Ž . Aumann, 1964 . In this formula, u , i is the utility that player i gets from the bundle and m, the population measure, is a nonatomic probability measure would not then be of bounded variation. Note that if the range space were taken to be L then the above set function would not even be a ϱ . measure; specifically, it would not be countably additive. In the first part of this paper, these limitations on the range of the vector measure and on the space in which it lies are dispensed with. Thus, the results of Aumann and Shapley are generalized to a much larger class of vector measure games.
As the above market game example demonstrates, the present interpretation of ''vector measure games'' is broad enough to include all games in which the worth of a coalition is not affected by the addition or subtraction of a set of players of measure zeroᎏthe measure in question being a fixed nonatomic scalar measure on the space of players. All the games that belong to one of the spaces of games on which Aumann and Shapley have proved the existence of a unique value have this property, and can therefore be represented as vector measure games. This representation is, however, not unique. It is therefore desirable to reformulate the conditions for a vector measure game to belong to one of these spaces in a language that does not make an explicit reference to vector measures. Such an alternative formulation is presented in the second part of the paper, where the above conditions are stated as differentiability and continuity conditions on a suitable extension of the game, an ideal game, that assigns a worth to every ideal, or ''fuzzy'', coalition, in which some players are only partial members.
The last part of the paper contains an example that shows how these general results can be applied to market games. Another application, involving cooperative games derived from a particular class of nonatomic Ž noncooperative congestion games, is given in a separate paper Milchtaich, . 1995 . Two rather technical lemmas, which are of some independent interest, are given in the Appendix.
PRELIMINARIES
Ž . The player space is a measurable space I, C C . A member of the -field C C is called a coalition. A set function is a function from C C into a real Banach space X. The¨ariation of a set function¨is the extended < < real-valued function¨defined by
where the supremum is taken over all finite nondecreasing sequences of coalitions of the form S : S : иии : S s S. A set function¨is of
BV denotes the normed linear space of all games of bounded variation endowed with the operations of pointwise addition and multiplication by a Ž . Ž real scalar and with the¨ariation norm called the ''variation'' in Aumann . 5 5 < <Ž . and Shapley, 1974¨s¨I . The monotonic games span this space.
BV
The subspace of BV that consists of all finitely additive real-valued set functions of bounded variation is denoted FA. Ž . Aëctor measure is a countably additive set function. A finite, signed measure is a real-valued vector measure. A vector measure is nonatomic Ž . if for every S g C C such that S / 0 there is a subset T : S such that Ž . Ž . < < Ž T , S _ T / 0. The variation also called the total variation . measure of a vector measure of bounded variation is a measure Ž . < < Diestel and Uhl, 1977, p. 3 Ž . Ž The range of a vector measure is the set C C . If the range of or, . more precisely, the subspace it spans is finite dimensional then is automatically of bounded variation. If is also nonatomic then its range is Ž . compact and convex Lyapunoff theorem . The range of a general nonatomic vector measure need not be compact nor convex. However, for Ž . Ä Ž . 4 every vector measure the set I I s h N h g I I is convex and Ž . weakly compact Diestel and Uhl, 1977, p. 263 . This set coincides with the Ž . closed convex hull of C C , and if is nonatomic then it is also the weak Ž . Ž . Ž . closure of C C Diestel and Uhl, 1977, p. 264 . We will call I I the extended range of .
Ž
. EXAMPLE. Let m be a probability measure on I, C C , and define Ž . Ž . : C C ª L m by S s . Then is a vector measure of bounded 1 S variation whose variation is m. Therefore, is nonatomic if and only if m Ž . is nonatomic. The range of consists of all equivalence classes of characteristic functions of measurable subsets of I. This is a closed, but Ž . not convex, subset of L m , and if m is nonatomic then it is also not 1 Ž . compact. The extended range of is the set of all equivalence classes of measurable functions from I into the unit interval. Indeed, for every Ž . h g I I, h s h. Note that in this example the weak compactness of the extended range of follows immediately from Alaoglu's theorem and from the fact that the relative weak topology on this set coincides with the Ž . relative weak* topology on it when seen as a subset of L m . We will say that a real-valued function f defined on a convex subset C of a Banach space X is differentiable at x g C if there exists a continuous Ž . linear functional Df x g Y *, where Y is the subspace of X spanned by Ä 4 C y C sy y z N y , z g Cand Y * is its dual space, such that for every Ž . function to a convex subset of its domain is respectively, weakly continuously differentiable. Continuous differentiability and weak continuous differentiability are equivalent for functions with compact domain. This follows from the fact that the relativization of the weak topology to a compact subset of a Banach space coincides with the relative norm Ž topology because every set which is closed, and hence compact, with respect to the relative norm topology is compact, and hence closed, also . with respect to the relative weak topology . A real-valued function f Ž . defined on a bounded convex subset C of a Banach space X is weakly Ž . continuous at every point x at which it is respectively, weakly continuw ously differentiable. Proof: If U is a convex neighborhood of x in C in which f is differentiable then it follows from the mean value theorem that is generated by all powers of nonatomic probability measures is denoted pNA . This space is a proper subset of pNA. 
VECTOR MEASURE GAMES
A composed set function of the form f ( , where is a nonatomic vector measure of bounded variation and f is a real-valued function Ž . Ž . defined on I I such that f 0 s 0, will be called a¨ector measure game. Kohlberg, 1973; Aumann and Shapley, 1974, Theorem C; Tauman, 1982 . Ž Note that if the range of is relatively compact this is automatically the case if X is a reflexive space or a separable dual space; see Diestel and . Ž Uhl, 1977, p. 266 then by Mazur theorem Dunford and Schwartz, 1958, p. . 416 the extended range of is compact. Therefore, in such a case f is weakly continuously differentiable if and only if it is continuously differentiable.
If a vector measure game f ( is monotonic, then for it to be in pNA it Ž . suffices that f be continuous, rather than differentiable, at 0 and I . PROPOSITION 1. Let be a nonatomic¨ector measure of bounded Ž .ariation, and let f : I I ª R be weakly continuously differentiable in ŽÄ < < <Ž . < <Ž .4. Ž . h g I I 0 -h -I and continuous at 0 and at I . If f ( is Ž . a monotonic game then it is in pNA and its¨alue is gi¨en by 2 .
The following lemma, which is of some independent interest, is used in the proofs of Theorem 1 and Proposition 1. LEMMA 1. Let : C C ª X be a nonatomic¨ector measure of bounded Ž .ariation, and let f be a real-¨alued function defined on I I . Define 
t follows from Lemma 1 that, conceptually, there is only one kind of vector measures that needs to be considered in the present context, namely, vector measures that map coalitions into their characteristic functions. One may thus wonder whether vector measures need to be considered at all. An alternative approach might be to express the above conditions for a game to be in pNA or in pNA directly in terms of a ϱ particular ''extension'' of the game into a function on I I. We will see in the next section that these results can indeed be reformulated in such a manner.
DIFFERENTIABLE IDEAL GAMES
Ž An ideal game is a real-valued function on I I that vanishes at the . constant function 0. We will say that an ideal game¨* is monotonic if Ž . Ž . h F g implies¨* h F¨* g , and that¨* is differentiable at h g I I if there Ž . Ž. exists a necessarily unique nonatomic measure D¨* h , called the deri¨a-ti¨e of¨* at h, such that for every g g I Ï
as ª 0 . An ideal game is differentiable if it is differentiable at every q point in I I. An ideal game¨* is a continuous extension of a game¨if Ž . Ž . Ž * s¨S for every S g C C and¨* is continuous with respect to the S . Ž . NA-topology . Aumann and Shapley 1974, Proposition 22.16 showed that a continuous extension is always unique, and that a sufficient condition for a game to have such an extension is that there exists a sequence in pNA 5 5 < Ž .< that converges to that game in the supremum norm¨Ј s sup¨S .
The set of all games that satisfy this condition is closed under pointwise addition and multiplication by a real scalar, and is denoted pNAЈ. 
PROOFS
Proof of Lemma 1. For every h g I I y I I and every continuous linear
by Theorem IV.10.8 of Dunford and Schwartz 1958 . Taking the maximum 5 Ž .5 < < < < 5 Ž .5 over the unit sphere in X *, we get h
Ž . h is a well-defined continuous function from I I onto I I that iŝ continuous also with respect to the relative weak topologies on thesê Ž . Ž . spaces. It follows that f is well defined by 3 and that it is weakly Proof of Theorem 1. Suppose that f satisfies the condition of the theorem. In light of Lemma 1, it can be assumed without loss of generality Ž . that X s L m , where m is a nonatomic probability measure, and that Ž . ϱ F F F F Ž as F F varies over the finite subfields of C C, directed by inclusion. That is, for every ) 0 there exists a finite measurable partition of I such that, if 5 F F is the field generated by some finer finite measurable partition,
Let F F be a sub--field of C C, and let S, T g C C be such that T : S. For Ž . 0FtF1, define h s q t g I I . By the fundamental theorem of
where the last equality follows from the identity
Ž . Ž . same notation is used in 7 for the derivative of f at a point and for the Ž . representation of that derivative as an element of L m . In the special
H H
Ž . It follows from 7 and 8 that
Hence, in order to complete the proof of 6 if suffices to show that
uniformly in h g I I as F F varies over the finite subfields of C C, directed by inclusion. Df is a weakly continuous function defined on a weakly compact Ž . subset of L m . Therefore, it is uniformly weakly continuous and its range 1 Ž . is compact. Theorem IV.8.18 of Dunford and Schwartz 1958 asserts that, Ž .
This proves 9 . The same theorem, together with the
Ž . This, and the uniform weak continuity of Df, together imply 10 .
Since f is weakly continuous, it follows from Lemma 5 in the Appendix Ž Ž .. that the ideal game defined by h ¬ f h is a continuous extension of Ž . f(. Therefore, by Theorem H of Aumann and Shapley 1974 , the value of f ( is given by
Ž and the derivative on the right-hand side of this equation exists for almost . Ž . every 0 -t -1 . By definition of Df, this gives 2 .
The proof of the second part of the theorem will be given after the proof of Theorem 2. B Proof of Proposition 1. We prove Proposition 1 by making the following two modifications to the proof of the first part of Theorem 1.
Ž . First, since f is continuous at 0, and since h ª 0 is equivalent to Ž . m h ª 0, f is actually weakly continuous at 0. Similarly, f is weakly Ž . continuous at I . Since f is weakly continuously differentiable, and ŽÄ Ž . 4. Ž . hence weakly continuous, in h g I I N 0 -m h -1 s I I _ Ä Ž .4 Ž Ž .. 0, I , the ideal game h ¬ f h is continuous. Aumann and Shapley Ž . 1974, p.150 showed that a continuous extension of a monotonic game is a monotonic ideal game. It follows that, for every finite subfield F F of C C, the Ž . restriction of f to I I can be viewed as a nondecreasing continuous F F function on the unit cube in R n , where n is the dimension of the subspace Ž .
Ž . Ž of L m that is spanned by I I which is equal to the number of atoms S s Sand T s S . The monotonicity of f ( and of f ( implies that
and a similar inequality holds for the sum over i q 1, i q 2, . . . . It
ϱ weakly compact, an argument similar to that given in the proof of Theorem 1 shows that the limit of the last supremum as F F varies over the finite subfields of C C, directed by inclusion, is zero. Since is arbitrary, this 5 5 proves that lim f ( y f ( s 0, and therefore f ( g pNA. B
BV F F F F
Proof of Theorem 2. If¨* satisfies the condition of the theorem then Ž . Ž .* g s¨* h for every g and h in I I which are equal m-almost everywhere. Indeed, by the mean value theorem, there exists some 0 --1 such thaẗ Lemma 5 in the Appendix implies that Df is weakly continuous. There-Ž . fore, by Theorem 1, f ( g pNA . The formula for the value of¨s f ( ϱ Ž . now follows from 2 and from the above expression for Df.
Conversely, suppose that¨* is the continuous extension of a game¨in Ä 4 pNA . There exists a sequence¨of games in pNA whose continu-ϱ n nG1 ϱ 5 5 ous extensions satisfy the condition of the theorem such that¨y¨-ϱ n 4 yn for every n. Indeed, we can take these games to be polynomials in NA measures. For every u g pNA and for every ) 0 there is a nonatomic ϱ < Ž . Ž .< < <Ž5 5 probability measure m such that * h q g y u* h F u q ϱ . Ž . Ž m g for every g, h g I I and g R such that h q g g I I see the . Appendix . It follows that if u* is differentiable at h then
In particular, D¨h g y D¨h g F¨y¨for every n, nЈ, and For every n, let m be a nonatomic probability measure such that , this function is continuous, too. shown in the proof of Theorem 2 that¨can be represented as a vector measure game f ( , with f weakly continuously differentiable.
If f ( is a vector measure game such that f is weakly continuous on the extended range of , which is a subset of some Banach space X, then by Stone᎐Weierstrass theorem f can be uniformly approximated by poly-Ž . nomials in elements of the dual space X *. Specifically, since I I is weakly compact, and since the continuous linear functionals on X separate points in this set, for every ) 0 there are a finite sequence of functionals x U , x U , . . . , x U g X * and a polynomial p in n variables such Conversely, it is shown in the Appendix that if¨* is the continuous extension of a game¨in pNAЈ then there is a nonatomic probability measure m such that, for every g, h g I I which are equal m-almost Ž . Ž . everywhere,¨* g s¨* h . It follows that there exists a real-valued function f, defined on the extended range of the nonatomic vector measure of Ž . Ž Ž .. bounded variation defined as in the Example, such that¨* h s f h Ž . hgI I . Since¨* is continuous, by Lemma 5 in the Appendix f is weakly continuous. B Proof of Proposition 2. It suffices to show that if¨* satisfies the conditions of the proposition then there exist a vector measure and a Ž . function f, which satisfy the conditions of Proposition 1, such that¨* h Ž Ž .. Ž . Ž . s f h hgI I . Once we establish that¨* h s 0 for every h which Ž . Ž . is equal m-almost everywhere to 0 and that¨* g s¨* 1 for every g which is equal m-almost everywhere to 1 we can proceed almost exactly as in the proof of Theorem 2: define and f as in that proof, and use the Ž Ž .. Ä same arguments to show that Df и exists and is continuous in h g I I N Ž . 4 Ä Ž . Ž .4 0 -m h -1 s h g I I N h / 0, I , and that Df is therefore weakly Ž . Ä Ž .4 Ž . continuous in I I _ 0, I . The proof of Eq. 5 is also similar. Hence, Ž . Ž . w it only remains to show that¨* h ª 0 when h ª 0 or, equivalently, Ž .
Ž . w when m h ª 0 and that¨* g ª¨* 1 when g ª I or, equiva-Ž . x lently, when m g ª 1 .
Ž . Ž . Ž Ž .. For every g, h g I I such that h F g and m h -m g ,¨* h q t g y h w x is nondecreasing as a function of t in the interval 0, 1 and has a nonnegative continuous derivative in the interior of that interval. For Ž . Ž . hs0 identically and g s 1 identically this function is continuous also Ä 4 at the end points. Therefore, for every sequence h : I I such that n Ž .
Ä 4 Ž . h ª 0 and for every sequence g : I I such that h F g and g n n n n n Ž . 
. Ž . for m-almost every i for which h i / 0 the dot stands for scalar product . It is not difficult to see that such an allocation x maximizes the integral in Ž .
Ž . 16 . If x is an allocation which satisfies 17 for e¨ery i then the pair Ž Ž .. x, p h is called a transferable utility competiti¨e equilibrium corresponding to h. Such an allocation always exists: Since u is Borel measurable on R k = I and is continuous in the first argument, there exists a measurable q k Ž . function x: I ª R that satisfies 17 for every i for which the maximum q Ž on the right hand side of that equation is attained Wagner, 1977, Theo- . rem 9.2 . But, as we show next, this maximum is in fact attained for every i.
Ž . It follows that, given an allocation x that satisfies 17 for m-almost every i Ž . such that h i / 0, we can change the values that x takes at those points Ž . where 17 does not hold in such a way that the new function be an Ž . allocation that satisfies 17 everywhere. 
Ž . by 13 and 18 . It follows that if x is an allocation that satisfies 17 for Ž . 
. Ž . such that p g , p h ) 1rs for all j then, as shown above, both maxima
proves that¨* is differentiable at h, that its derivative there is absolutely continuous with respect to m , and that
The essential boundness of 1r␥ u x y p h и x y a follows from 19 . and from the definition of ␥. Since, for every g and h as above, 
APPENDIX

Approximation Lemma
The method of approximation employed in the proofs of Theorem 1 and Proposition 1 can be used more generally for approximating games in pNA , pNA, or pNAЈ. All three spaces of games are generated by powers ϱ of nonatomic probability measures, but the norm is different in each case.
5 5 The norm on pNAЈ is the supremum norm и Ј, the norm on pNA is the 5 5 5 5 variation norm и , and pNA is endowed with the norm и . These BV ϱ ϱ 5 5 5 5 5 5 norms satisfy и Ј F и F и , and the spaces themselves satisfy BV ϱ pNA : pNA : pNAЈ. Each of the three norms can be ''extended'' in a ϱ natural way to a norm on the linear space of extensions of games in the 5 5 < Ž .< 5 5 respective space. Specifically, we define¨* Ј s sup¨* h ,¨* s
4 NA, and¨* g y¨* h F m g y h for every g, h g I I, h F g when the ideal game¨* is the continuous extension of a game¨in pNAЈ, in pNA, or in pNA , respectively. The extension operator¨¬¨* is linear and
For every game¨in pNAЈ there exists a nonatomic probability measure Ž . m such that¨is in pNAЈ m , the closed linear subspace of pNAЈ that is generated by powers of nonatomic probability measures which are absow Ä Ž k . 4 lutely continuous with respect to m. If is a sequence of vectors
Žk. .
Žk.
of nonatomic probability measures, s , , . . . , , and
Žk. 5 p is a sequence of polynomials such that¨y p ( Ј ª 0,
then m can be chosen as Ý 1r 2 nиии q . For
Ž . every g, h g I I such that g s h m-almost everywhere,¨* g s¨* h . Similarly, if¨is in pNA or in pNA then there exists a nonatomic ϱ Ž .
Ž . probability measure m such that¨is in pNA m or in pNA m , respec-ϱ Ž . tively. These subspaces are defined in a similar way to pNAЈ m . For every Ž . finite subfield F F of C C and for every g g L m , the conditional expec-1 Ž . tation E g N F F is defined as that function on I which is constant on Ž .
w each atom S of the field F F and is equal there to 1rm S H g dm s 0, .* E h N F F is easily seen to be continuous. Its ''restriction'' to C C is the Ž . U Ž . game¨defined by¨S s¨ . Proof. One direction in trivial: if¨is the limit of a net in X then g X. Conversely, if¨is in X and F F is a finite subfield of C C then it is 5 5 5 5 Ž 5 5. not too difficult to see that¨F¨* s¨. Hence, for every game u every such u. Consider, then, a game of the form k , where is a nonatomic probability measure that is absolutely continuous with respect to m and k is a positive integer.
For every F F, is a nonatomic probability measure that is absolutely 
Topological Lemma
The relative weak topology on the extended range of a nonatomic vector measure of bounded variation is the strongest topology on that set with Ž . respect to which и is continuous on I I. This result constitutes the first part of the following lemma. 
